Keeping an eye out for “Humphrey’s Executor”

Critics of the ongoing reductions in force (RIF) efforts under the new administration have been quick to label them “illegal,” but that accusation has been used enough that it’s beginning to lose meaning. The real question, should there be any, is the constitutional silence on the matter of removing appointed officials. The Constitution clearly empowers the Executive Branch through broadly worded clauses about appointment and general executive authority, but it offers no specific guidance on dismissal. As a result, the issue has been shaped not by the founding document but by legislative measures and court decisions.

A decision that we may soon be hearing about is known as “ Humphrey’s Executor” or more specifically, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, a 1935 Supreme Court decision that placed limits on the president’s ability to remove certain appointed officials—particularly those serving on independent regulatory commissions.

The Trump administration can’t wait to challenge it, particularly under the same court that overturned the Chevron decision just last year.

The backstory behind Humphrey is interesting, and why “executor?” William E. Humphrey was appointed to a seven-year term on the Federal Trade Commission by President Hoover in 1931. When Franklin D. Roosevelt took office, he sought Humphrey’s resignation due to political disagreement over New Deal policies. Humphrey refused to resign, so Roosevelt fired him.

The FTC’s founding legislation from 1914, however, allowed removal only for cause—specifically, inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.

Humphrey challenged the firing in the courts but caught pneumonia and died before a final decision was reached. His estate—represented by his executor—continued the suit against the United States to recover the unpaid portion of his salary for his heirs. Eventually, the Supreme Court ruled in its favor, affirming that Congress could limit the president’s removal powers when it came to quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial officials.

It is also instructive to know the motivation behind the rule. The limitation stemmed from even earlier tensions, when in 1913, President Woodrow Wilson removed George W. Wickersham from the Commerce Court after Wickersham ruled against the administration. The political fallout prompted Congress to structure the FTC as an independent agency, insulated from such executive interference. It was a move shaped by the trust-busting, progressive impulses of the era—motivated by consumer protection and fears of executive overreach.

That populist mood, however, has shifted. Today’s electorate increasingly recognizes the bloated nature of government programs, some of which seem to operate without clear oversight or accountability. Concerns about an entrenched “deep state” have found traction across party lines, as has frustration with the inefficiency of government agencies immune to reform.

In this context, the administration’s efforts to revisit Humphrey’s Executor—and the broader framework of agency independence—make political and constitutional sense. With the Supreme Court having recently overturned the Chevron deference, which once gave federal agencies wide latitude in interpreting statutes, the time may be ripe for a reevaluation of executive authority in staffing and managing federal departments.

To be clear, we favor a humane approach to government reform—early retirements, hiring freezes, and the like--but we also support the principle that a president, like any CEO, should have the authority to appoint leaders who align with the administration’s goals and priorities. Just as a business on Norris Avenue would not tolerate a manager undermining ownership, the American people should not expect less coherence from their government.

It’s time to consider whether the legal guardrails of 1914 still serve the public interest in 2025.